Robert W. Clower's article "The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal" (1965) was central to the transformation of Keynesian macroeconomics since it contributed to the emergence of fixed-price models, in the 1970s. Despite this influence, no scholar has proposed to explain its origins. My paper aims to fill this gap. It is argued that Clower came to build his disequilibrium program of microfoundations after changing radically his views about the meaning and the nature of the 'Keynesian Revolution'. During a first research phase (1949)(1950)(1951)(1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957), Clower considered that Keynesian macroeconomics was compatible with market clearing and with Walrasian microfoundations. But he eventually moved away from these equilibrium and synthesis perspectives. During a second research phase (1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962), he came to conclude that Keynesian macroeconomics had to be rooted in a disequilibrium framework and could not be based on Walrasian microfoundations. Hence the existence of a volte-face.
sold to revise their production plans; Clower (1965) explained that if the labor market did not clear, workers would take into account the quantity of labor actually sold to revise their consumption plans. According to Barro and Grossman (1971) , these two behavioral hypotheses could be used to lay the foundations of a "general disequilibrium theory " (1971: p.83 ). This resulted in the seminal fixed-price model. Historians have also focused on the relationship between Clower and Patinkin's insights. Goulven Rubin (2005) argued that Clower (1965) borrowed most of Patinkin's (1956) concepts, Kevin D. Hoover (2012) stressed that like Patinkin (1956 ), Clower's approach to the microfoundations of macroeconomics consisted in elaborating general-equilibrium models that displayed Keynesian features, and Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013) presented the 1965 article as an internal criticism of Patinkin's disequilibrium macroeconomics. 4 Either way, it is still an issue to understand how Clower Clower's change in perspective took place in a two-step process. In an unpublished manuscript titled "Keynes and the Classics: A Reinterpretation" (1958), Clower formulated his first disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. This opened the second research phase. Thereafter, Clower came to conclude that the tâtonnement hypothesis and the Walrasian 4 According to Hoover (2012) , economists devised programs of microfoundations for macroeconomics long before the Lucasian Revolution. Patinkin and Clower would have contributed to the "general--equilibrium program" that was opened by John R. Hicks (1939) and that culminated with the fixed--price models, in the 1970s.
theory of the consumer had to be rejected to leave room for Keynes' insights in a generalequilibrium framework. I argue that Clower may have reinterpreted Keynesian macroeconomics from a disequilibrium perspective under the influence of Patinkin; and that his decision to reject part of Walrasian microfoundations was likely a reaction to the contradictions in the disequilibrium macroeconomics of Patinkin (1956 Patinkin ( , 1958 , and a result of the confrontation between Clower's concerns for unstable dynamics and the stability analyses led in the non-tâtonnement economics of Hahn and Negishi (1962) .
1. Equilibrium and synthesis perspectives: Phase I (1949 Phase I ( -1957 Between 1949 and 1957, Clower had two projects: to provide microfoundations to a Keynesian business cycle model and to elaborate a price theory capable of unifying all forms of competition. Despite their different objectives, these theoretical projects should be considered as part of the same research phase. All along the way, Clower considered that Keynesian macroeconomics was compatible with market clearing and with Walrasian microfoundations.
More generally, the issues related to individual disequilibrium and to its consequences were never a focal point; and Clower sought to extend Walrasian microeconomics, not to break with it.
1.1 The "general theory of the trade cycle"
Clower's first project was to provide microfoundations to a macromodel inspired by Keynes (1936) and capable of addressing fluctuations and economic growth à la Roy F. Harrod (1939) . 5 
It was outlined in Clower's doctoral dissertation, Theories of Capital Accumulation with Special Reference to their Ability to Explain the Experience of the U.S since 1870 (1952a):
The writer began by examining the general pure theory of economic behavior (as expressed e.g., in Value and Capital) in an attempt to discover whether that theory was in any way inadequate as a foundation for capital accumulation theory. After making appropriate alterations to the general theory, the writer tried to fit various recent theories of capital accumulation [Reference to Keynes (1936) , Harrod (1939) and Hicks (1950) ] into it as special cases (1952a: p. 8).
To elaborate his "general theory of capital accumulation", Clower proposed a "reinterpretation" and an "extension of Keynes's views on the theory of the trade cycle" (1952a:
p. 11). The "reinterpretation" consisted of explaining fluctuations thanks to the variations of the liquidity preference instead of those of the marginal efficiency of the capital (1952a: pp. 80-83). The "extension" consisted of broadening the liquidity preference theory to physical assets (1952a: p. 69). Hence, trade cycles resulted from a capital accumulation process destabilized by speculative behavior (1952a: p. 79). Starting from this explanation of fluctuations, Clower built a 'stock-flow' macromodel. The stock dimension was related to entrepreneurs' demand for the existing stock of capital assets, and accounted for the determination of the real interest rate. 6 The flow dimension was related to entrepreneurs' decisions to invest and to produce. And the inter-relationship between these two dimensions served to analyze the capital accumulation process -depending on the level of the real interest rate, the flow of new investment and the flow of depreciation may not match thus leading to variations of the stock of capital assets.
Clower argued that because of speculative behavior, entrepreneurs' demand for the existing stock of capital assets was subject to violent and repeated changes. This would prevent investment, production, and capital assets from reaching stationary positions and, in turn, would explain trade cycles (1952a: p. 89). On that basis, Clower made two points. The first one was that the instability underlying trade cycles in his macromodel was related structurally to the inter-relationship between the stocks and the flows of capital assets. The second one was that the same was true in Harrod-type models since the instability was closely related to the acceleration principle, a relation linking the rate at which the flow of output was changing with the stock of capital assets (1952a: p. 11). Clower concluded that the inter-relationship between stocks and flows was the essence of the capital accumulation process. 7 Since this interrelationship was at the heart of his macromodel, he claimed to have elaborated a "general" theory of the trade cycle (1952a: p. 184).
The challenge was to incorporate the relation of stocks and flows into the standard theory of choice and then, to undertake the derivation of Keynes and Keynesian business cycle 6 Clower was concerned with the determination of real magnitudes: "Entrepreneurs' views concerning the profitability of owning real assets [depended on] the relative prices of inputs and outputs" (1952a: p. 68).
7 "The argument in previous chapters has been devoted primarily to demonstrating the unity of recent theories of capital accumulation. In retrospect, it appears that the thread which links together various theories -a thread that is hidden by difference in method and content -is to be found in the distinction between the using and the holding of assets [reference to Keynes (1936) ]. This distinction obviously implies but it is not implied by the distinction between stocks and flows [reference to the models following Harrod (1939) and Hicks (1950) A 'stock-flow' market theory accounted for the determination of prices when individuals' plans to produce and to consume goods in the current market period were 8 For an exhaustive presentation of Hicks' method, see Roy Weintraub (1979) . For a short presentation, see Hoover (2012 distinguished from individuals' plans to hold goods in stocks, at the end of the market period.
Formally, on the flow dimension, a set of supply and demand functions described the quantity produced and consumed during the current market period. On the stock dimension, Clower added a set of supply and demand functions describing the quantity inherited from the activities of past market periods and the quantities that individuals wanted to hold in stocks at the end of the current market period. On that basis, Clower distinguished two types of equilibria. The first one was "temporary" since the stocks available in the economy showed a tendency either to rise or to fall. For a given vector of prices, individuals would like to hold stocks of commodities different from the one inherited from the past. The stocks would be adjusted by the quantities newly produced and consumed in the market period. For that new stock available, a new price vector would be set. The process would continue until the quantity of stocks and prices became "stationary". This situation characterized the second type of equilibrium. From 1952 to 1957, Clower studied the static and dynamic properties of these models so as to know whether they could be used to link the theory of choice developed in the dissertation and Keynesian theories of the trade cycle. In the absence of conclusive results, the project petered out.
Employment fluctuations, individual equilibrium, and tâtonnement dynamics
Both the 'stock-flow' market analyses and the doctoral dissertation are useful to account for the equilibrium perspective adopted by Clower in his microfoundational program. Clower's attitude regarding involuntary unemployment indicates that individual disequilibrium and its consequences were outside the field of investigation. Clower and Bushaw did not even mention the concept in Introduction to Mathematical Economics. From the beginning, Clower (1952a) argued that it was not of fundamental importance to know whether workers were voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed during the downturn. The effect on economic activity would be the same. Accordingly, in the context of trade cycles studies, it would be enough to account for the fluctuations of employment:
In practice, it is clear that large declines in employment may have the same influence on economic activity whether workers were voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. We leave the matter at that (1952a: p. 66).
In spite of this lack of interest in the voluntary/involuntary distinction, Clower (1952a) proposed a short reflection on how to incorporate involuntary unemployment in a market framework. He gave emphasis to the form of the labor supply function. 46). This equilibrium perspective is also contemplated in dynamics. While studying the stability conditions of the 'stock-flow' price theory in discrete time, Bushaw and Clower (1957) insisted on the assumption that at any market period, all the markets cleared:
p₁ (t) and p₂ (t) assume values which make market demand equal to market supply at the beginning of each period (1957: p. 84).
The dynamic path of the economy would be determined by the variations of the stocks of commodities in the economy. It was assumed that the stationary equilibrium was reached when the net changes of stocks from period to period were nil (1957: p. 84). In continuous time, the dynamics was based on the same logic. Following economists such as Lange (1945) and Samuelson (1947) , Bushaw and Clower studied the stability properties of tâtonnement processes (1954c: p. 343; 1957: p. 101 ). Accordingly, the focus was on the dynamic of abstract economies in which disequilibrium transactions were excluded. Individual disequilibrium and their consequences were therefore out of the field of investigations in 'stock-flow' market analyses.
13 "One has to make a series of assumption to obtain a supply function equivalent to the one used by Keynes (i.e., a function of a form which permits one to talk about 'involuntary' unemployment)" (Clower, 1952a: p. 66 ). 14 This assumption, also made by Franco Modigliani (1944) and Oskar Lange (1945) , became very common in the 1950s. On its relevance to portray involuntary unemployment, see Michel De Vroey (2004) .
The compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories
In the introduction of his dissertation, Clower wondered about the compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories. He claimed that the two theories were fundamentally compatible. Nonetheless, Walrasian microeconomics needed to be modified to ground Keynesian macroeconomics:
From a formal point of view, is the General Theory a special case of established general equilibrium theory? Once again, there are essential differences between the two levels of analysis, differences which may not be reconcilable until the foundations of general equilibrium theory are broadened (1952a: p. 5).
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According to Clower, neither Keynes' theory of investment nor his theory of consumption could be linked directly to Walrasian microeconomics. In the former case, this was because the standard theory of the firm did not distinguish the holding from the using of assets, and did not account for entrepreneurs' appreciation of the business climate (1952a: p. 71). Hence Clower's decision to broaden standard optimization plans. He proposed the 'producer-consumer' theory of the firm and showed that the resulting theory of investment "was equivalent to the theory of Keynes" (1952a: p. 62) . 16 In the later case, Clower's aim was to explain why income was an independent variable at the aggregate level while it was not at the microeconomic level (1952a: p 64). For that purpose, he aggregated consumers' optimization plans, drew upon a national accounting relation to stress that money consumption depended on money income (1952a: p.
65), and made a few other assumptions to "arrive at the Keynesian propensity to consume" (1952a: p. 65). 17 Besides, Clower (1952a) 15 Clower referred to Hicks' Walrasian framework when using labels such as "established general equilibrium theory" or "standard microeconomics" (1952a: p. 8). 16 For further details on Clower's demonstration, see Plassard (2017) . 17 Clower started from optimization plans and deduced aggregate versions of supply and demand functions by simple summation (1952a: p. 61; p. 63). Clower justified this aggregation procedure by referring to Hicks' commodity theorem. The theorem defined the conditions to treat the aggregate as an individual (Hoover, 2012: p. 36 ).
would underpin the minimum limit of investment at which the economy would rebound. Then, since this "floor" was supposed to depend on the stock of capital assets accumulated and that this stock was likely to increase over time (1952a: p. 43), a rising trend would be established.
In parallel, Clower argued that the 'producer-consumer' theory of the firm was a relevant foundation for the accelerator (1952a: p. 57) and could be used to justify the 'stock-flow' architecture of his Keynesian business cycle model. Though largely implicit, connections with Keynesian macroeconomics were proposed both in partial and general equilibrium frameworks. In partial equilibrium, Clower was concerned with Keynes' theory of investment (1954a) and with the liquidity preference theory (1954b). Clower (1954b) demonstrated that the dynamic path of the rate of interest was largely determined by the excess-stock-demand for bonds, not by the excess-flow-demand for bonds (p. 114). This feature was presented as a proof that the rate of interest was governed by speculative behavior, not by saving and investment. Then, Clower (1954a) demonstrated that given different levels of the rate of interest, the relation between the stock demand and the associated level of net investment could be used to obtain "a curve K(r) which Keynes would call schedule of marginal efficiency of capital" (p. 76). Besides, in general equilibrium, Bushaw and Clower (1954c) referred to the project sketched in the doctoral dissertation. The 'stockflow' price theory could ground the "models based on the acceleration principle" (1954c: p.
328). The reason was dynamic. The inter-relationship between stocks and flows was viewed as a source of instability ignored in pure stock and pure flow models (1954: pp. 341-342) . 18 Clower presented in details his modifications of standard microeconomics in two papers: "Mr. Graaff's Producer--Consumer Theory: A Restatement and Correction" (1952b) and "Professor Duesenberry and Traditional Theory" (1952c The key to understand the project is to acknowledge that whatever the forms of competitive structure, the determination of equilibrium prices is based on the same logic. Clower considered that individuals (whether a "market authority" embodied by the figure of the broker, a seller, or a group of sellers) would try to find equilibrium prices trying to avoid unwanted stocks. Clower pointed out that, in perfect competition, brokers were responsible for setting equilibrium prices following a tâtonnement process. He concluded that a broker could be viewed "as an actual unit of economic decision similar to consumer and business units" (c1954a: p. 31), supposed to set prices following an internal equilibrium condition represented by a "desired excess-demand".
Clower's point was that the equilibrium condition of a broker did not match necessarily the market one. In this case, the broker would observe unwanted variations of stocks. This would be a signal to vary prices. This procedure of revision would occur until the brokers' "desired excess demand" and market excess demand would be simultaneously nil. After having presented this procedure of revision of prices, Clower turned to non-competitive structures. He argued that, if the assumption of "demand certainty" was dropped, price determination would appear to be analogous to the one occurring in perfect competition. In a monopoly, the seller decided on the level of production by estimating the price at which he would sell the integrality of the production and would maximize his profits. Of course, he may make mistakes, failing to correctly anticipate the objective demand. Accordingly, he would be forced to increase his stocks of goods or would not be able to exploit all the profit opportunities. To avoid the repetition of such scenarios, the seller would revise price until his internal equilibrium coincided with the market equilibrium. According to Clower, once this element of uncertainty was introduced in the standard monopoly theory, the extension to oligopoly model would be quasi natural. The difficulty would lie in the treatment of firms' interdependences. By showing that price determination was based on the same logic whatever the competition structure, Clower thought he had found the way to elaborate a "general price theory" allowing the unification of all forms of competition.
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To undertake this unification, Clower set dynamical systems with various adjustment rules describing the behavior of prices, outputs, and realized sales:
It will now be clear that the more general model is neither competitive nor noncompetitive. Instead, it is a general theory of market adjustment (c.1954a: p. 43).
The difficulty was to define the adjustment processes in a sufficiently general way to ensure the deduction of specific behavior related to the market structures. During the 1950s, Clower sought for the best formalization of these adjustment processes. Unfortunately, the complexity of the dynamical systems made it difficult to study their stability conditions. Most of the time, dynamic analyses were therefore absent. This problem of tractability was put forward by
Clower to explain why it would be preferable to stick to the assumption of perfect competition (1957: p. 190 ). Since he was unable to find a way to simplify these models, the project petered out.
Disequilibrium was not the issue
Despite the diversity of models developed by Clower, he always considered situations in which "individuals" (whether a "market authority", a seller, or a group of sellers) set prices and made mistakes thus leading to disequilibrium transactions. For example, Clower (1957) assumed that independent sellers produced in time (t-1) a homogeneous good that they brought to the market in time t. At the beginning of the market period, they set the price at which they undertook to deliver the goods during the market period. The market price was supposed to be the minimum of the prices set by sellers. Those who set higher prices would not be able to sell the quantity they had planned. Symmetrically, consumers would not be able to realize their consumption plans when the quantities sold at the market price were not sufficient. 
Extension of the "traditional general equilibrium theory"
Now, let us focus on Clower's synthesis perspective. In his first manuscript, Clower claimed that his "general theory of price determination" was the result of an extension of the "traditional" general equilibrium theory:
The The extension concerned the dynamic procedure of revision of prices implied by the tâtonnement hypothesis. To stress the existence of a "general theory of price determination", 22 "Therefore, market equilibrium (in monopoly) is defined by the intersection of the supply curve s with the demand curve d- a result which is remarquably similar to that which defines market equilibrium price in an isolated competitive market! […] Here, precisely as in the case of the monopoly, market equilibrium is defined by the intersection of the market supply and demand curves s and d" (1957: p. 189).
Clower proposed to couple this procedure with the assumption that the Walrasian broker did not want to hold unwanted stocks.
During the development of his project, Clower wondered whether simple extensions of Walrasian microeconomics were sufficient to account for the kind of behavior addressed in his "general" theory. In 1959, he mentioned the possibility of a break with the "traditional price theory". But he claimed that it was preferable to remain in this established framework:
The inadequacies of traditional price theory as an instrument for describing observed market behavior have become increasingly apparent in recent years. It
is still an open question, however, whether these shortcomings can be removed by appropriate generalizations of existing theories or whether modifications of a more fundamental kind will be required.
[…] It seems to me that both points of view entail interesting programs of research and that neither can be said to involve anything more than this at the present time.
[…] Meanwhile, it is interesting to speculate about the possible fruitfulness of an approach which lies somewhere between the two extremes.
[…] The purpose of the present paper is to elaborate upon this theme by sketching a simplified "learning model" of oligopoly which is broadly consistent with traditional doctrine yet sufficiently general to include both established monopoly theory and the accepted theory of pure competition as special cases (1959a: p. 2).
Therefore, Clower considered that his "general theory of price determination" was compatible with Walrasian economics.
To conclude, until 1957 Clower developed two theoretical projects in which he was never interested in involuntary unemployment and more generally in individual disequilibrium its consequences (e.g., spill-over effects). Moreover, he always considered that extensions of "established" general equilibrium theory were sufficient to build his theoretical models. The heart of the problem seems to be that Keynes, unlike the specialists in tâtonnement economics, assumes that market excess demands depend in part on the level of current transactions (that is to say, income flows). Dependence upon income as an independent variable is obviously inconsistent with traditional preference analysis since, if income is taken as given it is not possible to define factor supply functions. Why this difficulty has not been noticed before I cannot say, but I can tell you that it is more difficult to get over than one might suspect at first sight. My own proposal is a kind of dual decision theory of the consumer, which makes sense in a dynamic context, and happens to include traditional preference analysis as a special case -valid under full employment conditions.
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The argument mentioned was the heart of the 1965 piece. Clower realized that Keynesian relations such as the consumption function could not be derived from Walrasian microeconomics. This was because realized income was an independent variable in Keynes' theory of consumption while it was not in the Walrasian theory. In the latter, individuals were supposed to chose their income when determining their selling and purchasing plans. Income was endogenous. No adjustment of consumption was possible unless prices varied. As a result, realized income could not act as a constraint in the Walrasian demand for consumption goods.
For that to be possible, Clower contended that an alternative theory of the consumer was required. He proposed the 'dual-decision' hypothesis.
Why such a volte-face?
There is a coincidence in time between the emergence of Clower's disequilibrium Second, the theoretical proximity between the two authors is undeniable. In 1958,
Clower nearly paraphrased Patinkin (1956) to criticize Keynes (1936) for having defined involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium situation:
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the matter is the fact that if w and p just happen to fall at the same rate of time then, starting from an initial position of Keynesian equilibrium (with excess supply in the labor market), the economy will remain 'in equilibrium' indefinitely although prices and wages are constantly falling over time! Under these circumstances, it is perhaps natural to speak of the difference ˢ -ᵈ as 'involuntary unemployment'; but it is a curious of language to refer to the situation as a whole as one of equilibrium (1958, p.
13).
All, then that Keynes means by the statement that the system may settle down to a position of 'unemployment equilibrium' is that the automatic workings of the system will not restore the system to a position of full employment equilibrium.
He does not mean 'equilibrium' in the usual sense of the term that nothing tends to change in the system. All that is strictly in equilibrium is the level-or, possibly, only the fact-of unemployment; but there is no equilibrium of the money wage rate (Patinkin, 1956: p. 471 ). Indeed, it is the very departure from these curves, and the resulting striving of individuals to return to the optimal behavior which they represent, which provides the motive power of the dynamic process itself. Thus our task in studying involuntary unemployment is to free ourselves of the mental habitlong ingrained by the methods of static analysis -of seeing only the points on the demand or supply curve (Patinkin, 1956: p. 220 ).
Lastly, Clower resorted to the logic of the 'spill-over effect' in the disequilibrium model put forward in 1958. The same mechanism underlined his application of "Keynes' version of Say's law". Patinkin described the behavior of entrepreneurs that failed to sell the quantity of goods they had planned. They would take into account the level of demand as an additional constraint and would redefine their labor demand. Clower described the income constraints imposed on workers' consumption when they failed to sell the quantity of labor they had planned. This was the symmetric effect. Now, let us explain why Clower eventually considered that the Walrasian and Keynesian theories were fundamentally incompatible, a position diametrically opposed to Patinkin's (1956) . Rubin (2005) considered that the roots of Clower's break with the Walrasian framework lie in Patinkin's own contradictions. Whilst studying their positions on the validity of Walras' law, Rubin showed that Patinkin (1956; preferred contradicting himself rather than rejecting the Walrasian framework. Clower (1965) would have identified the gaps and would have drawn the consequences that the invalidation of Walras' law was the sine qua non of the Keynesian theory.
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Rubin's viewpoint is here reinforced by putting Patinkin's contradictions in perspective with the contemporaneous development in non-tâtonnement economics and with Clower's ambition to account for the instability of market economies, in his disequilibrium theory.
The dynamics of market economies and, more specifically, the possibility of a longlasting depression was core to Clower's disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory.
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A disequilibrium model would have to account for i) the rationing suffered by workers in the market for labor; ii) workers' incentive to change the employment situation and the resulting pressures on wages; and iii) the dynamic of the whole economy, given that entrepreneurs have no interest to modify the employment situation. In this context, Clower insisted on the inability of the market system to bring the economy back to the full employment equilibrium.
In view of Clower's concerns for unstable dynamics, the contributions of Patinkin (1956; on one side, and of Hahn and Negishi (1962) (Clower, 1965: p.41) .
30 "On the other hand, any point which lies on the demand curve but above the supply curve refers to a state of involuntary unemployment in the sense of Keynes.
[…] Under the latter circumstances, the marginal utility of the real wage exceeds the marginal disutility of labor, whereas the marginal product of labor is equal to real wage; hence households alone have an incentive to expand employment. By analogy with situations of a similar sort experienced in practice, it is natural to regard these as 'depression' states of the model. The interesting thing about 'depression' states is that it is not directly plausible to say that they cannot persist indefinitely. No doubt it can be asserted, with good reasons that any particular 'depression' state tends to be followed by another 'depression' state, and so on, indefinitely. This is clearly a dynamical stability question " (1960: p. 23 At first sight then, there would seem to be no place for the operation of Walras' law (Patinkin, 1958: p. 314 ).
In spite of these contradictions with his disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory, Patinkin sought to maintain the validity of Walras' law. To this end, he assumed that workers adjusted passively their labor supply to the demand for labor:
One way out of this difficulty (there may well be others) is to assume it away by attributing to workers a completely passive behavior pattern according to which they adjust the amount of labor they plan to supply to the amount employers demand at the going wage rate (Patinkin, 1958: p. 314 ).
Under these circumstances, "equilibrium always [existed] in the labor market " (1958: p. 314) and so, Walras' law was respected. Patinkin acknowledged that his solution "[dodged] the real difficulties" (1958: p. 315). But the problem really was that the very existence of his disequilibrium analysis was in question. If the labor market was in "equilibrium", the dynamic pressure supposed to act on wages in situation of involuntary unemployment did no longer exist.
Accordingly, involuntary unemployment stopped being a dynamic phenomenon and so, Keynesian macroeconomics lost its status of disequilibrium theory. In a different way, the contemporaneous development in non-tâtonnement economics also emphasized the dynamic consequences of keeping Walras' law valid. Hahn and Negishi (1962) It turns out that the theoretical message underlying the 1965 piece was that a break with the Walrasian framework was the key to vindicate the Keynesian heterodoxy. Such a view was expressed in section II of the "Counter-Revolution" paper, when Clower established a link between three "Keynesian indictments": the instability of the full employment equilibrium, the rejection of Walras' law, and the breaching of the "second postulate " (1965; p. 40) . The core of the "Counter-Revolution" paper was devoted to the relation between the 'dual-decision' hypothesis and Walras' law. Clower demonstrated that the substitution of a "constrained demand" to a "notional demand" turned Walras' equality into an inequality in case of nonclearing labor market (1965: p. 53) . 31 This is the best known part of his argumentation, which
is not the case of the relation between Walras' law and the instability of the full employment equilibrium. Clower contended that its validity entailed the existence of symmetric pressures on wage and price so that the return to the full employment equilibrium was ensured (1965: p. The point of the example is merely to illustrate that, when income appears as an independent variable in the market excess-demand functions -more generally, when transactions quantities enter into the definition of these functionstraditional price theory ceases to shed any light on the dynamic stability of a market economy (1965: p. 55).
Since the disequilibrium theory sketched in the 1965 piece could integrate consistently the three main "Keynesian indictments", Clower firmly believed that he was taking the right direction to ground Keynes' economics. 32 That is also why he did not hesitate to reject Walrasian microeconomics.
31 Note that market non--clearing and the breaching of the "second postulate" are two sides of the same coin. 32 Clower ended the discussion of his article at the Royaumont conference arguing that "people, including himself, had failed to understand that there was a general equilibrium interpretation of Keynes, namely the one
Conclusion
My paper aimed to explain the genesis of the "Counter-Revolution" paper. This was a difficult task since it entailed solving the mystery which, very often, surrounded Clower's contributions. He was an ambitious economist, asked important questions to understand the functioning of market economies, and always provided promising intuitions to answer. But he rarely succeeded in formalizing the models that fully supported his views. So, intuitions were often put in the back burner. This makes it difficult to reconstitute the logic of his thought.
Because of that, an archival work was necessary. It helped to reveal the intuitions, the intellectual influences, and the aims contemplated.
The 1965 piece was presented as the result of a volte-face. Clower's (1965) and Prices may have played a key role in the first move. Then, Clower's decision to reject part of Walrasian microfoundations was explained as the result of his ambition to feature unstable market adjustment processes, and of his confrontation with both Patinkin's (1956; contradictions and with the stability analyses led by Hahn and Negishi (1962) . These influences show that interactions between Walrasian macroeconomics and non-tâtonnement economics contributed to the emergence of the search for disequilibrium foundations for Keynesian economics.
he had developed, which made all of the more familiar interpretation in terms of equational inconsistencies, rigid wages, liquidity traps, etc., unnecessary (Hahn and Brechling, 1965: p.309 ).
